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THE KATECHON IN THE AGE OF BIOPOLITICAL NIHILISM 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the most important contemporary developments in continental political thought is its 
‘messianic turn’, associated with the work of Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, Alain 
Badiou, Jean Luc Nancy and Slavoj Zizek. Despite their enormous differences, these and 
other participants in this discussion all share a sense of exigency about the advent of a 
radically different world: the world of democracy to come, the coming community, the 
politics of truth, a new ‘creation’ of the world or emancipatory ‘divine violence’. What 
constitutes these diverse orientations as messianic is less their relation to any historical 
tradition of messianism than this exigency that the potentiality of radical change be 
actualized. What this thought opposes is therefore not a purely secularist politics that would 
be wholly indifferent to the messianic, but another tradition, which is both aware and wary of 
the messianic event and seeks to delay its advent at all cost. Just as the contemporary 
messianic turn, which is strongly influenced by Pauline epistles, this tradition, which 
arguably continues to define the basic coordinates of Western politics, is also grounded in a 
particular interpretation of a (disputed) Pauline text, namely the passage in the Second Letter 
to the Thessalonians on the figure of the katechon.  
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As this article shall demonstrate, the passage on the katechon in 2 Thessalonians 2 is 
one of the most intensely political texts in the Western tradition and the conflict over its 
interpretation is similarly an intensely political struggle, at stake in which is the very 
existence of constituted power. Moreover, the significance of this text has little to do with a 
persistence of a vestige of the theological in modern politics. On the contrary, we shall argue 
that the logic of the katechon only fully comes into its own in the contemporary condition of 
biopolitical nihilism and any serious attempt to overcome this nihilism will therefore have to 
confront this logic. We shall begin by setting out two diametrically opposed approaches to 
the passage in a reading of Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Carl Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
katechon, demonstrating that this critique is not merely a matter of context-specific 
disagreement but rather exemplifies the fundamental division on the question of the political 
as such. In the following two sections we shall address the functioning of this concept in the 
contemporary context of biopolitics, devoid of the eschatological dimension. The reading of 
Paolo Virno’s attempt at a positive revaluation of the katechon in the context of the 
naturalistic philosophical anthropology and Roberto Esposito’s study of the immunitary 
orientation of modern politics will help us reconstruct the logic of the katechon in terms of 
the problem of the negation of negativity. In the fourth section we shall elaborate this logic in 
the analysis of Walter Benjamin’s theory of baroque sovereignty and demonstrate that pace 
Schmitt the katechon does not function as a link between the political and the eschatological, 
but rather exists only as the severance of this link, whereby nihilism, as it were, theologizes 
itself. In the concluding section we shall return to Agamben’s messianic interpretation of 2 
Thessalonians 2 and address the conditions for the fulfillment of the messianic exigency in 
the contemporary political terrain. 
 
Schmitt and Agamben on 2 Thessalonians 2 
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What is the political significance of the Second Letter to the Thessalonians? In this letter, 
Paul (or perhaps his disciple) responds to the audience’s agitation concerning the imminence 
of the Second Coming addressed in the First Letter, explaining the present withholding of 
parousia and elaborating the process by which it will eventually take place:  
 
Let no one deceive you in any way. Because it will not be unless the apostasy shall 
have come first, and the man of lawlessness, the son of destruction is revealed. He 
opposes and exalts himself above every so-called god and object of worship. As a 
result, he seats himself in the sanctuary of God and declares himself to be God. […] 
You know what it is that is now holding him back, so that he will be revealed when 
the time comes. For the mystery of anomy is already at work, but only until the person 
now holding him back (ho katechon) is removed. Then the lawless one (anomos) will 
be revealed, whom the Lord will abolish with the breath of his mouth, rendering him 
inoperative by the manifestation of his presence (parousia).1 
 
Since the notion of the katechon does not occur anywhere else in the Scripture, the 
interpretation of this passage remains somewhat ambiguous, particularly with respect to what 
or who the katechon is and what its relation is to Antichrist (the ‘lawless one’), whose 
revelation and abolition would pave the way for parousia.2 According to Agamben, the 
tradition that identifies the katechon with the Roman Empire, endowing it with a positive 
function of delaying the end of time, begins with Tertullian. Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
figure of the katechon in the Nomos of the Earth is a paradigmatic example of this tradition 
and unfolds in the context of his discussion of the medieval spatial order, out of whose 
dissolution the modern international law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum, which is the central 
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focus of the book, arose. The unity of this spatial order was guaranteed by the Holy Roman 
Empire, which is introduced by Schmitt as the first historical figure of the katechon and 
remains the only one that he considers at length: 
 
The Christian empire was not eternal. It always had its own end and that of the present 
eon in view. Nevertheless, it was capable of being a historical power. The decisive 
historical concept of this continuity was that of restrainer: katechon. ‘Empire’ in this 
sense meant the historical power to restrain the appearance of the Antichrist and the 
end of the present eon; it was a power that withholds, as the Apostle Paul said in his 
Second Letter to the Thessalonians. […] The empire of the Christian Middle Ages 
lasted only as long as the idea of the katechon was alive. 3  
 
For Schmitt, the understanding of the Empire in terms of the katechon provided a link 
between the eschatological promise of Christianity and the concrete experience of history, 
explaining the delay of parousia and giving meaning to historical and political action, which 
the imminence of parousia would devalue:  
 
I do not believe that any historical concept other than katechon would have been 
possible for the original Christian faith. The belief that a restrainer holds back the end 
of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological 
paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the 
Christian empire of the German kings.4 
 
Thus, for Schmitt the idea of the katechon made it possible simultaneously to endow 
Christianity with political form and significance and incorporate the pre-Christian forms of 
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political authority into the eschatological context of Christianity. Nonetheless, it is important 
to emphasise that Schmitt’s articulation between eschatology and political history is only 
possible on the basis of historical developments centuries after the writing of the Letter: since 
Paul’s text could not possibly refer to a Christian katechon, Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
katechon necessarily breaks with the context of 2 Thessalonians 2.5 
In the absence of this idea of the katechon, the political authority of the empire loses 
its concrete spatial unity and degenerates into pure ‘Ceasarism’, a ‘typically non-Christian 
form of power’: ‘after the beginning of the 13th century this knowledge of the meaning of 
Christian history gradually disappeared. The great philosophical systems also destroyed the 
concrete sense of history and dissolved the historical manifestations of the struggle against 
heathens and non-believers into neutral generalizations.’6 Thus, while Schmitt continued to 
apply the concept of the katechon in his discussion of modern politics, e.g. with reference to 
19th century Britain,7 these references are largely allegorical, since the concrete meaning of 
the concept is often difficult to recognize in them, the katechon itself becoming one more 
‘neutral generalization’. Indeed, this perception of the decline of the katechon helps us 
understand not only Schmitt’s ambivalent relation to Christianity but also the formalism of 
Schmitt’s own Weimar-era political theory, which conservative critics such as Leo Strauss 
accused of being precisely yet another neutral generalization.8 
Even in its neutral allegorical form the concept of the katechon remains crucial for 
Schmitt in his post-Weimar ‘concrete order thinking’: ‘I believe in the katechon; for me he is 
the sole possibility for a Christian to understand history and find it meaningful.’9 In this 
staggering statement Schmitt explicitly proclaims as the object of his belief not a figure of the 
divine but rather the secular force that restrains the ultimate advent of the divine. What does 
it mean to believe in the katechon and how does this belief relate to the rather more familiar 
belief in God? In Agamben’s argument, the belief in the katechon as a neutral generalization 
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characterizes every theory of the State, ‘which thinks of it as a power destined to block or 
delay catastrophe’.10 The ‘neutral generalization’ of the concept thus coincides with its 
secularization, which in Agamben’s reading ‘leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply 
moving them from one place to another. Thus, the political secularization of theological 
concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but 
displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact.’11 In this 
neutral and general sense the katechon refers to any constituted authority, whose function is 
to delay the social catastrophe while simultaneously withholding a radical redemption from 
it. Every political theory that is grounded in a philosophical anthropology that posits human 
nature as inherently dangerous or even evil makes recourse to some form of the katechon as 
an agent of a civilizing ‘denaturation’ of the human condition.12 The central figure in this 
secularization of the logic of the katechon is of course Thomas Hobbes, whose theory of 
sovereignty seeks precisely to ward off the anomic catastrophe of war of every man against 
every man, whose potentiality is inscribed in the state of nature. Hobbes’s theory serves as a 
point of departure for Agamben’s critique of the logic of sovereignty, a brief consideration of 
which will make intelligible his alternative reading of Paul’s passage on the katechon.   
In Homo Sacer Agamben argues that Hobbes’s secularization of the katechon 
conceals the originary belonging of the anomic state of nature to the order of the 
commonwealth as its ‘negative foundation’. The natural ‘evil’ that the sovereign is to restrain 
is neither spatially exterior nor temporally antecedent to the civil order, but is constituted 
within it in the manner of the state of exception, in which the order is treated as if dissolved 
(tanquam dissoluta).13 ‘Far from being a prejuridical condition that is indifferent to the law of 
the city, the Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that constitutes and 
dwells within it. It is not so much a war of all against all, as, more precisely, a condition in 
which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer for everyone else.’14 The state of nature is 
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constituted by the sovereign decision that, by treating the civil state as dissolved, suspends 
the operation of its internal laws and norms and thereby reduces the existence of its 
population to ‘bare life’. In this condition, the covenant is treated as void and the subject is 
simultaneously abandoned by the sovereign, i.e. left without his protection, and abandoned to 
the sovereign’s unlimited exercise of violence. If the state of nature is the product of the 
political, then the flaws and imperfections of the political, including the periodic or perpetual 
relapses into the state of exception, can by definition no longer be justified as ‘lesser evils’ in 
comparison with the ‘return’ to the state of nature, since they are nothing but this return 
itself. Agamben’s critique of the philosophy of the political from Hobbes to Schmitt and 
beyond may thus be summed up in the claim that the ‘lesser evil’ of sovereignty is nothing 
less than Absolute Evil, since it is able to present itself as the Good despite being the origin 
of the very evil it struggles against.  
This thesis guides Agamben’s interpretation of the passage on the katechon in 2 
Thessalonians 2. In Time that Remains Agamben asserts that rather than grounding 
something like a Christian ‘doctrine of State power’, this passage harbours no positive 
valuation of the katechon whatsoever, especially since the term could not possibly refer to 
Christian ‘state power’. Indeed, in the above-cited fragment, the katechon is something that is 
to be ‘removed’ or taken ‘out of the way’ in order to reveal the ‘mystery of anomie’ that is 
‘already at work’. In Agamben’s reading of Paul, anomie refers to the suspension of the law 
in the messianic state of exception (katargesis), whereby the law is rendered inoperative and 
remains in force without significance.15 Insofar as this katargesis is not something 
perpetually to come but is ‘already at work’, the katechon as a structure of constituted 
authority originally represented by the Roman Empire merely defers the ultimate unveiling of 
the ‘absence of law’: ‘The unveiling of this mystery entails bringing to light the inoperativity 
of the law and the substantial illegitimacy of each and every power in messianic time’.16 
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Similarly to his enfolding of Hobbes’s state of nature back into the order of the 
commonwealth in the mode of the state of exception, Agamben’s reading of Paul emphasises 
the way anomie is always already at work within the order of constituted power, which 
appropriates it and limits its use to the sovereign alone. Yet, if all power is illegitimate, then it 
is impossible to distinguish the katechon as a power that restrains anomie from the figure of 
the anomos that is conventionally held to refer to the Antichrist. Agamben proposes to 
conceive of the two figures as two aspects of one single power before and after the unveiling 
of the ‘mystery of anomie’: ‘Profane power – albeit of the Roman empire or any other power 
– is the semblance that covers up the substantial lawlessness of messianic time. In solving the 
‘mystery’, semblance is cast out and power assumes the figure of the anomos, of that which is 
the absolute outlaw.’17 
This reading completely modifies the very terms, in which the problematic of the 
katechon is articulated. As we have seen, in the Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition the 
secularized katechon is legitimized as the only force that wards off the natural anomie and 
thus the end of the social order as we know it. The political, understood in terms of the 
sovereign decision on the friend-enemy distinction that restrains the extension of anomie to 
the entire existing order, is thus not merely grasped by analogy with the theological, as in 
Schmitt’s method of political theology,18 but is rather itself theologized as a transcendent 
foundation of political order so that Schmitt could indeed believe in the katechon without 
necessarily believing in God.  
In contrast, Agamben’s reading suggests that the katechon is the Antichrist that 
perpetuates its reign by concealing the fact of its long having arrived and pretending, as a 
‘lesser evil’, to ward off its own advent. In this reading, the idea of the katechon is an 
insidious device, by which ‘substantially illegitimate’, anomic power perpetuates its reign, 
diverting the quest for redemption to the preoccupation with protection against the ‘greater 
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evil’ that requires obedience to the ‘lesser’ evil of constituted authority. It is precisely this 
survival of evil in the guise of a victory over it, whereby the Antichrist as katechon inserts 
itself between us and parousia, that constitutes what Paul calls the ‘mystery’ of anomie, 
which finds its ultimate resolution in the reappropriation of anomie by the messianic 
community. Against Schmitt’s claim that the katechon serves as the link between Christian 
eschatology and authentic historical existence, founding and legitimizing the reign of the 
Empire, Agamben argues that the intention of the Letter is to affirm precisely this ‘removal’ 
of the katechon so that ‘2 Thess. 2 may not be used to found a ‘Christian doctrine’ of power 
in any manner whatsoever.’19 
The diametrically opposed positions of Schmitt and Agamben on the katechon 
demonstrate the extreme political intensity of 2 Thessalonians 2 as one of the foundational 
texts of the Western political tradition. The relation to the katechon indicates nothing less 
than one’s stand on the very question of the political and at least implicitly traverses every 
single problematic of political ontology, from natural law to contract theory, from the right of 
revolt to the war on terror. While for the Hobbesian-Schmittian orientation the restraining 
function of the katechon stabilizes the existing terrain of the political as ‘all there is’ and its 
disappearance is only thinkable as the self-destruction of humanity, Agamben’s messianic 
approach insists on the removal of the katechon as the condition of possibility of life beyond 
the familiar coordinates of the political, defined by the logic of sovereignty.  
While at first glance the obscure passage in Paul’s Epistle would be of dubious 
relevance to contemporary politics, which no longer strives to establish a relation to 
eschatological transcendence and is content with purely immanentist management of people 
and things, this article shall demonstrate that the logic of the katechon has successfully 
reinstated itself in the problematics that appear furthest away from all things theological, e.g. 
the post-Foucauldian problematic of biopolitical governance. Moreover, the logic of the 
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katechon and even its explicit concept have found their way into the critical, ‘radical-
democratic’ discourses that relentlessly battle the Hobbesian-Schmittian understanding of the 
political, in which this concept has been foundational. In the following section we shall 
address the recent reappraisal of the concept in the political theory of Paolo Virno, whose 
anti-statist orientation does not prevent a positive revaluation of the idea of the katechon in 
terms of the philosophical anthropology that has completely dispensed with theological 
transcendence.  
 
The Katechon as a Historico-Natural Institution 
 
In his radical-democratic theory of the multitude Paolo Virno attempts to dissociate the figure 
of the katechon from the sovereign power of the state.20 Contrary to the prevailing tendency 
in today’s critical thought Virno does not question the anthropological presuppositions of the 
Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition of the political but rather accepts from the outset that man is 
‘evil’, ‘problematic’ or ‘dangerous’.21 Yet, the conclusions he draws from this acceptance are 
strikingly different: ‘the risky instability of the human animal – so called evil, in sum – does 
not imply at all the formation and maintenance of that ‘supreme empire’ that is the 
sovereignty of the state.’22  
Along the lines of Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology that influenced 
both Schmitt and Heidegger, Virno understands the human being as radically open and 
‘incomplete’, lacking any determinate identity or vocation and hence defined solely by its 
possibilities, including the possibility to negate any determinate state of the world or the self. 
While these characteristics define the human being as capable of innovative action, creativity 
and the ‘good life’, they also make possible intense ‘intra-species aggression’: ‘[truly] radical 
evil is precisely and solely the evil that shares the same root as the good life.’23 While the 
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Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition of the political finds in this radical ambivalence of the human 
being the justification for the establishment of political institutions that contain, limit or 
divert the dangers arising from human nature, Virno follows Agamben in arguing that these 
institutions themselves remain grounded in the state of nature as long as they retain the 
sovereign capacity to suspend the legal order in the state of exception: ‘the state of exception, 
by subverting the pseudo-environmental uniformity assured by civil laws, restores the 
‘opening to the world’ to its imponderable consequences. But it restores this opening, let us 
note, as an exclusive requisite of sovereignty.’24  
While in the state of exception the natural powers of the human condition are 
restricted to the figure of the sovereign that functions as the remnant of the natural within the 
historical, Virno’s democracy of the multitude rather consists in the appropriation by the 
multitude of its natural powers through the construction of ‘historico-natural’ institutions that 
make possible the concrete historical application of the ambivalent potentialities of the 
human condition in the acts of speech and praxis. The katechon is presented by Virno as the 
paradigm of such an institution, a force that restrains natural evil, keeps it at bay, without 
being able to expunge or defeat it. This force ‘remains close’ to the evil that it restrains and 
‘does not even avoid mingling with it’, ‘adhering to chaos’ that it resists: the katechon 
‘safeguards the ‘radical evil’ that it has engendered: the antidote here is no different from the 
poison.’25 Virno dismisses Schmitt’s reduction of the katechon to the state and proposes to 
view it as a ‘bioanthropological constant’,26 an innate apotropaic function that seeks to 
preserve the natural forces against complete self-destruction through their own unhindered 
operation: ‘if [the katechon] limits aggression, it gets in the way of having this aggression 
annihilated once and for all.’27 Moreover, in its protection of these natural forces the katechon 
can draw on nothing other than these forces themselves: ‘[the] (auto)destructive drives 
connected to the opening to the world can be confronted thanks only to the same bio-
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linguistic conditions that are the foundation and guarantee of this opening.’28 Virno’s 
katechon is thus an institution that protects human nature from itself, for itself and by itself. 
By dissociating the katechon from the idea of transcendence Virno dissolves the link 
that Schmitt’s reading establishes between sovereign power and the eschatological 
dimension. While for Schmitt the obscurity of the eschaton entails a neutralization of the 
power of the katechon, Virno’s theory rather points to a puzzling resilience of the logic of the 
katechon in the symbolic universe, from which every idea of transcendence appears to be 
evacuated. 
 
[Katechon], a radically anti-eschatological and theologico-political concept, is 
opposed to the ‘end of the world’, or, better yet, to the atrophy of the opening to the 
world. […] Both victorious evil and complete victory over evil lead to the same end, 
that is to say, to the state of atrophy. By placing itself in opposition to danger and also 
to the elimination of that danger, to the Antichrist and also to the Messiah, the 
katechon delays the end of the world. Katechon not only oscillates between the 
negative and the positive, without ever expunging the negative; it also safeguards the 
state of oscillation and its persistence as such.29  
 
This description of the katechon as an immanent force of deferral evidently resonates 
with Derrida’s logic of diffèrance, the quasi-transcendental force of constitutive and 
constantly renewed deferral that makes the eschaton or simply the end of anything radically 
inaccessible.30 As the cure against poison that consists in the introjection of the poison itself, 
the katechon epitomizes the notion of the pharmakon in Derrida’s reading of Plato.31 
However, whereas Derrida deployed this logic to destabilize institutional structures, Virno 
affirms it as an institutional alternative to the Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition of the political. 
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It is nonetheless easy to demonstrate that this immanentist version of the katechon remains 
within the orbit of the tradition it criticizes. 
‘Victorious evil’ and ‘complete victory over evil’ can only be posited as identical if 
we understand parousia as completely immanent to this world. Only if the eschaton refers 
nowhere but back to the world itself may the ‘end of the world’ be approached as equivalent 
to the victory of worldly forces that retain their potentiality for evil. Yet, in this case, it would 
be impossible to speak of any ‘atrophy’ or ‘entropy’, let alone of the closure of the human 
‘opening to the world’, since it is precisely this opening that would be victorious in the 
parousia. Indeed, Agamben’s reinterpretation of Pauline messianism approaches parousia in 
this minimalist manner as the reappropriation of the general anomie that already characterizes 
the human condition but is concealed by the presence of the katechon. Agamben’s 
understanding of redemption in terms of the appropriation of the sheer facticity of existence 
that he terms ‘the irreparable’ rejects any attempt to found politics and social life on the 
transcendence of nature and instead affirms a rethought figure of human life devoid of all 
separations and negativity: ‘the life that begins on Earth after the last day is simply human 
life.’32 For Agamben, then, the fact that the victory of evil and the victory over it are one and 
the same would merely indicate the need to get the katechon that blocks this possibility of 
victory ‘out of the way’. In contrast, for Virno the katechon, no longer taking the form of the 
sovereign state, continues to function as the restrainer of the Antichrist, who in his 
naturalistic theory cannot be anyone other than ourselves in our species-specific ambivalence.  
In this insistence on the restraining force of the katechon Virno is much closer to the 
Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition than he cares to admit. As a restrainer of the constitutive 
ambivalence of the human condition, the katechon stands opposed to two extreme 
possibilities: the anarchic potentiality of the ‘state of nature’, devoid of any positive rules that 
rein in the natural regularity of species-specific behaviours, and the constituted order, whose 
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positive rules trample, distort or simply ignore this regularity. Its function is to mediate 
between rules and regularity, ordering the anarchic state of nature yet at the same time 
‘naturalizing’ this order by returning it to the anthropological conditions of its possibility.  
However, isn’t this exactly what the Hobbesian-Schmittian sovereign power does? 
Through its potentiality for self-suspension in the state of exception, the sovereign state 
ensures the existence of the link between law and life, norm and fact, etc., and only in this 
manner may it claim to mitigate, restrain or control the anarchic potentialities of the natural 
state of humanity. Just as Virno’s katechon, sovereign power ‘gives evidence to the relation 
between regularity and rules, or to the intertwining of natural life and political praxis’.33 Yet, 
while the logic of sovereignty does so by the appropriation of natural powers that are then 
deployed to exercise power over the same natural powers of the subjects, thus instantiating 
history as a partial transcendence of nature, the multitude in Virno’s analysis, which 
resonates with the more familiar work of Hardt and Negri,34 reclaims these powers in order to 
govern itself in a democracy of pure immanence, a ‘historico-natural reality, [which] exhibits, 
in its very mode of being, the peculiar historical situation in which all the distinctive traits of 
human nature have earned an immediate political relevance’.35  
Nonetheless, this post-sovereign democracy is a far cry from any utopia of anarchic 
bliss, since the function of the katechon is now taken up by the multitude itself, which 
restrains and inhibits the negative aspects of the human condition. Yet, the only resources that 
it has at its disposal are these very negative aspects themselves. For example, the faculty of 
negation, whose ‘evil’ character is best exemplified by the human capacity to refuse 
recognition to another member of the species, is tamed by the possibility to negate this very 
negation and thus allow for reciprocal recognition. We may therefore define the function of 
the katechon as a double negation or, more precisely, the negation of the originary negativity 
of the human condition. The democracy of the multitude consists in the ceaseless work of 
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negating its own negativity, immunizing itself against its own danger to itself, ‘[providing] 
protection by making use of the same conditions that give birth to danger’.36 
While Virno offers his version of the katechon as a model of anti-statist politics, his 
understanding of politics in terms of ‘experimenting with new and more effective ways of 
negating negation’37 is functionally indistinct from the Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition that he 
opposes. In fact, Virno’s idea of immunization resonates with the political philosophy of 
Roberto Esposito, for whom the ‘immunitary paradigm’ provides a key to the understanding 
of the biopolitical turn in modern politics, inaugurated precisely by Hobbes. Yet, as the 
following section shall demonstrate, despite Virno’s enthusiastic embrace of Esposito’s 
notion,38 Esposito does not propose the katechonic logic of immunity as a solution to the 
problem of sovereign power but rather posits it as the very origin of this problem. 
  
The Katechon and the Aporia of Immunity 
 
Esposito’s concept of immunity, central to his theory of biopolitics, refers to the logic of 
exemption or separation that protects individual identity from its total dispersion into or 
expropriation by the common. To be immune is to be free from the communal obligation of 
reciprocity, to enjoy autonomy in relation to community.39 Immunity presupposes community 
and seeks to protect it from the total dissolution of individuality but it only does so by 
injecting the community with its own negation. It is this immunitary logic that accounts for 
the specificity of modern biopolitics: while politics has always and everywhere been 
concerned with the defense of life in various ways, in Western modernity immunity has 
become the essence of politics and accounts for its aporetic character.  
The notion of immunity permits Esposito to connect the two aspects of biopolitics that 
made Michel Foucault’s original articulation of the concept so ambiguous and subsequently 
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launched two divergent theories: Agamben’s ‘negative’ biopolitics of exclusion and 
destruction of ‘bare life’ and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics of immaterial labour and the 
immanent democracy of the multitude. For Esposito, biopolitics is always both negative and 
positive, destructive and productive, objectifying and subjectifying. These antinomic aspects 
are articulated by the principle of immunity, whereby life is protected negatively, i.e. by 
means of the introjection of very negativity that it is protected from. ‘Just as in the medical 
practice of vaccinating the individual body, so the immunization of the political body 
functions similarly, introducing within it a fragment of the same pathogen from which it 
wants to protect itself, by blocking and contradicting natural development.’40 The immunitary 
logic of modernity, whose genealogy Esposito traces from Hobbes through Hegel and 
Nietzsche to the philosophical anthropology of Scheler and Plessner, rethinks negativity as 
the productive impulse of life, constitutive of human existence as radically open and 
potential, risky and dynamic. Virno’s emphasis on the radical ambivalence of the human 
condition that harbours evil within itself belongs squarely to this immunitary trajectory. His 
insistence on the apotropaic function of the katechon is therefore part of the modern political 
tradition that focuses on the protection of life from itself and constructs a series of artificial 
structures that save life from its natural dangers. For Esposito, sovereignty, liberty and 
property are precisely such mediating institutions oriented towards the negative protection of 
the immediacy of life. It is easy to observe the aporetic character of this project: ‘[the] 
pretense of responding to an immediacy is contradictory to the mediations’, which end up 
‘rebounding against their own proper meanings, twisting against themselves’.41  
The Hobbesian logic of sovereignty, whose secularization of the logic of the katechon 
we have addressed above, offers the most striking expression of this aporia. In the state of 
nature any attempt to protect life poses a threat to it, insofar as the fundamental equality 
among human beings in this state presupposes an equal capacity for killing and being killed. 
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The natural immunity of the human being, its drive for self-preservation, is therefore 
insufficient and must be supplemented by an ‘induced’ artificial immunity that both negates 
the former and realizes its goal. ‘In order to save itself, life needs to step out from itself and 
constitute a transcendental point from which it receives orders and shelter.’42 Yet, the 
sovereign figure that occupies this transcendental point is simultaneously nothing other than 
the element of that very ‘life’ and ‘nature’ that it is meant to protect. In full accordance with 
Virno’s notion of the katechon as a ‘historico-natural’ institution, the Hobbesian sovereign is 
constituted by the self-negation of nature, which preserves itself by separating itself from 
itself and redoubling itself as artifice. The sovereign power of the katechon may thus be 
defined as an immanent transcendence of nature, which can only relate to life in a negative 
manner, since it is itself the product of life’s self-negation. At the same time, this negativity is 
nothing other than the force of life itself, which has been artificially separated from the 
natural condition and presents itself as its transcendence.  
Derrida’s notion of the supplement succinctly sums up the paradox of the immanent 
transcendence of the katechon: in its attempt to ‘supply what is lacking’ (the restraint of 
natural negativity), the katechon is inevitably driven to ‘replace’, with the effects of its own 
interventions, the very nature it intended to ‘complete’.43. While Derrida’s argument has 
more often been deployed in the mode of a de-naturalizing critique, which exposes 
supplementary artifice in every pretense to natural authenticity, the direction of criticism may 
easily be reversed to demonstrate that this artifice itself has no other origin than the nature it 
supplements. The katechon is a part of nature that posits a lack (negativity) in nature that it 
protects it from by injecting nature with the excess of negativity, whose origin can only be 
natural as well. Thus, contrary to Virno’s enthusiastic embrace of katechonic mediation 
between nature and history, Esposito argues that this immunitary paradigm is inherently 
countereffective due to its logical structure of the double negation: 
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Immunity, because it is secondary and derivative with respect to the force that it is 
intent on fighting, always remains subaltern to it. Immunity negates the power of 
negation, at least what it considers as such. Yet it is precisely because of this that 
immunity continues to speak the language of the negative, which it would like to 
annul: in order to avoid a potential evil it produces the real one; it substitutes an 
excess with a defect, a fullness with an emptiness, a plus with a minus, negating what 
it affirms and so doing affirming nothing other than its negation.44 
 
This aporia of the negation of nihilism reaches its extreme point in Nazi biopolitics, 
which renounces the logic of mediation and applies its politics to life directly: ‘What before 
had always been a vitalist metaphor becomes a reality in Nazism.’45 Yet, despite this radical 
difference, which in Esposito’s argument places Nazism outside the Western political 
tradition,46 Nazism persists in the same nihilistic paradigm of immunization, which 
articulates the therapeutic intention of the social policy of the regime with its genocidal 
outcome: ‘it is only by killing as many people as possible that one could heal those who 
represented the true Germany.’47 The extremity of the Nazi genocide, whose suicidal climax 
was reached in Hitler’s 1945 Demolition Order which exposed to death the very population 
that the genocide sought to protect, is not a perversion of the immunitary paradigm, but rather 
its logical conclusion, whereby the immunitarian logic folds back on itself in an auto-immune 
manner: ‘[Nazism] strengthened its own immunitary apparatus to the point of remaining 
victim to it. The only way for an individual or collective organism to save itself definitely 
from the risk of death is to die.’48  
From this perspective, the genocidal violence of Nazism has nothing to do with the 
absence of a restraining katechonic function. On the contrary, the genocide was in itself an 
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exercise of the restraining force of the katechon (the Nazi party-state), which first made 
biology the sole object of its protection and then sought to restrain the degenerate negativity 
it quite unsurprisingly found everywhere in the biological substance of the population. If the 
danger happens to be everywhere, then the restraining response of the katechon must 
similarly be total. Moreover, since the katechon derives the means of protection from the very 
condition it protects from, these means can only be negative. Thus, the restraining actions of 
the katechon logically take the form of total negation. The sole difference of Nazism from the 
more moderate versions of the modern katechon consists in its construction of human nature, 
whose potential for evil is to be restrained, in strictly biological terms. Yet, this shift from the 
metaphorical to the literal and from mediation to the immediate takes place within the 
nihilistic coordinates of the logic of immunization, which alone makes this shift intelligible as 
an expression of an exasperated attempt to escape the aporia of the negative protection of life. 
Thus, it is the condition of nihilism that brings immunitary biopolitics into being as an 
attempt to resolve the problem of how to negate negativity. While the Schmittian 
understanding of the katechon conceives of it as the point of articulation between the 
historical and the eschatological, our identification of the katechonic function with the 
immunitary politics of modern nihilism demonstrates that this articulation is purely negative 
and consists entirely in the fissure itself. It is precisely by obscuring the eschatological 
dimension that constituted powers of modern nihilism are able to theologize themselves as 
transcendent in relation to the realm of immanence they necessarily arise from. The reason 
why Schmitt could believe in the katechon is that it is indeed an idol that fills the 
eschatological void of modern nihilism. In the following section we shall elaborate this 
paradoxical status of the katechon in a brief analysis of Walter Benjamin’s theory of baroque 
sovereignty.  
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Between Nature and History 
 
The problem of nihilism is central to Esposito’s paradigm of immunization, not merely with 
regard to its internal logic of the negation of negativity, but also with regard to the temporal 
context of its emergence. Contrary to Schmitt, who inferred from the eclipse of eschatology 
the decline of the katechon, the logic of katechonic immunization was only able to dominate 
the entire political terrain in the nihilistic condition of modernity, ‘when the mechanisms of 
defense that had up until that moment constituted the shell of symbolic protection began to 
weaken, beginning with the transcendental perspective linked to a theological matrix. […] 
Modern man needs a series of immunitary apparatuses that are intended to protect a life that 
has been completely given over to itself when the secularization of religious meaning takes 
place.’49 This thesis finds a brilliant illustration in Walter Benjamin’s Origin of German 
Tragic Drama, which in Agamben’s reading is an esoteric critical response to Schmitt’s 
theory of sovereignty.50 In Political Theology Schmitt goes beyond his earlier theorization of 
sovereignty in Die Diktatur as split between the poles of law-preserving power (commissarial 
dictatorship) or law-making power (sovereign dictatorship) and famously identifies 
sovereignty with the decision on the exception that suspends the operation of existing law in 
the manner analogous to the miracle in theology.51 In his history of the Baroque Trauerspiel 
Benjamin initially adopts the same concept of sovereignty, yet proceeds to deconstruct it, 
presenting the baroque sovereign as the figure constitutively incapable of any decision.  
Benjamin’s point of departure in his analysis of the Trauerspiel is the transformation 
in the perception of temporality in the baroque age due to the eclipse of the eschatological 
dimension and the consequent blurring of the distinction between history and nature, whereby 
the ‘[constantly] repeated drama of the rise and fall of princes appeared as the natural aspect 
of the course of history, essential in its permanence’.52 As Michel Foucault has argued in his 
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genealogy of modern governmentality, the temporality of the period is indefinite, lacking 
both an origin and, more importantly for our purposes, an endpoint: ‘There is nothing like a 
dream of the last Empire that dominated medieval religious and historical perspectives. […] 
We now find ourselves in a perspective in which historical time is indefinite, in a perspective 
of indefinite governmentality with no foreseeable term or final aim.’53  In this indefinite time 
without origin or end, the eschatological dimension is blocked and the historical world is 
perceived as ‘nature deprived of grace’.54 This ‘state of nature’ has nothing to do with a pre-
historic innocence, either idyllic or savage, but is solely the effect of the decay and 
decomposition of eschatological historicity: 
 
The religious man of the baroque era clings so tightly to the world because of the 
feeling that is being driven with it toward a cataract. The baroque knows no 
eschatology, and for that very reason it possesses no mechanism by which all earthly 
things are gathered together and exalted before being consigned to their end. The 
hereafter is emptied of everything which contains the slightest breath of this world.55 
  
In this world of history-become-nature transcendence is emptied of any possible 
content but remains present as an ‘ultimate heaven’, a ‘vacuum’ that is capable of one day 
‘destroying the world with catastrophic violence’.56 It is from this perspective that we should 
understand Benjamin’s minimal yet profound amendment to Schmitt’s definition of 
sovereignty: ‘the baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency and 
makes it the most important function of the prince to exclude this.’57 While Schmitt’s 
sovereign consummates his power by deciding on the exception and thus bringing it into 
being in the manner of the miracle, Benjamin’s baroque sovereign is rather faced with a more 
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prosaic yet also more difficult task of excluding the exception, which has already taken place 
and even become the rule.  
It is here that we encounter the figure of the katechon. As Agamben argues in his 
reading of the Benjamin-Schmitt debate, the evacuation of the eschatological dimension 
ruptures the systematic analogy that Schmitt’s political theology established between the 
sovereign and God.58 The baroque sovereign is in contrast defined precisely by having 
nothing to do with divinity: ‘However highly he is enthroned over subject and state, his status 
is confined to the world of creation; he is the lord of creatures but he remains a creature.’59 
To rule over creatures while remaining a creature is precisely the function of immanent 
transcendence, the separation of nature from itself that has been highlighted in various ways 
by Agamben, Esposito and Virno. Indeed, the baroque sovereign is a perfect example of 
Virno’s historico-natural institution, since it deploys its powers, drawn from nature, to 
restrain the negativity of natural forces.  
Yet, how can the baroque sovereign do that? It is clear that insofar as the eschaton is 
empty, the victory of natural ‘evil’ (the secular Antichrist) has already taken place and takes 
the form of the state of exception. To the extent that the sovereign is a lord of creatures that is 
itself a creature it is necessarily itself contaminated by this natural evil. Hence, the only 
possible task of the baroque sovereign qua katechon is to persevere in its own being without 
being consumed by the very state of exception it is always already caught up in and, literally, 
consists of. By injecting the natural negativity of existence with the induced negativity of 
rule, the sovereign immunizes itself against the dangers of the very forces its own being is 
composed of. What the katechon must protect in the age of nihilism is primarily itself. 
Faced with the task of self-preservation in the naturalized state of exception, the 
sovereign seeks to accumulate as much power as possible and in this manner becomes a 
tyrant, lacking anything like a restraining function, including the function of self-restraint. 
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From the outset, the tyrant acts on the basis of hubris, as a ‘deranged creation’, ‘erupting into 
madness like a volcano and destroying himself and his entire court’.60 Similarly to Esposito’s 
idea of Nazism as an exasperated hyper-immunization that ends up destroying what it meant 
to protect, the tyrant’s violence injects limitless negativity into the existing order, ultimately 
undermining the tyrant’s own existence, which is after all as natural as that of the subjects 
over which it reigns. Falling victim to the ‘disproportion between the unlimited hierarchical 
dignity with which he is divinely invested and the humble estate of his humanity’,61 the 
fearful tyrant is at the permanent risk of turning into a pitiful martyr.  
There is only one possibility to exit the endless oscillation between tyranny and 
martyrdom in the structure of baroque sovereignty, which consists in the transformation of 
the sovereign into the intriguer (Intrigant). Contrary to the tyrant, who violently tries to 
exclude the state of exception and falls victim to it, the intriguer, usually represented in the 
Baroque drama by the servant to the prince, is perfectly aware that the state of exception is all 
there is and rather than vainly attempt to exclude it he tries to make use of it through 
ceaseless plotting and scheming.62 While the baroque sovereign begins by attempting to 
enact, in its own person, the immanent transcendence of nature, which entangles it in the 
tyrannical hubris, the intriguer renounces all transcendence in favour of a purely immanent 
governance by staging plots and conspiracies, which, in accordance with the general 
reduction of history to nature, are grounded in the ‘anthropological, even physiological 
knowledge’ of human beings and the virtuous manipulation of natural human forces.63 ‘The 
intriguer exploits mechanisms of human action as the result of forces over which there can be 
no ultimate control, but which can therefore be made the subject of probabilistic 
calculations.’64  
It is easy to recognize in this ‘rule by intrigue’ an Urform of what Foucault termed 
governmentality,65 whose genealogy is traced back precisely to the indefinite temporality of 
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the baroque age that gives rise to the administrative state and the doctrine of raison d’etat, 
whose mutation in the late 18th-early 19th centuries leads to liberal biopolitical rule.66 While 
immanentist biopolitical government deploys its knowledge of human nature for the purposes 
of ordering human existence, directing and optimizing the development of biological forces, 
the sovereign intriguer relies on the same knowledge in conspiratorial plotting, whose 
purpose is destabilization in the interest of its own self-preservation, the management of the 
state of exception that no longer seeks to exclude it but solely to enhance one’s own standing 
within it.67 This split of government into biopolitical management and sovereign scheming, 
which we may observe everywhere around us, defines the entire space of modern politics, 
insofar as its eschatological horizon continues to be blocked. 
 Any political discourse that ventures beyond this narrow repertoire must first recover 
the question of redemption, as Agamben does in his messianic reading of Paul.68 Nonetheless, 
while Paul’s strategy of the generalized katargesis of all constituted power is animated by the 
promise of the Second Coming, in the context of contemporary nihilism no theological 
solution, of the kind offered by John Milbank’s ‘radical orthodox’ reading of Paul, appears 
adequate to the task. Any exit from nihilism back into a ‘restored ontology of undying life’ 
can be undertaken only in bad faith, which, moreover, appears to lead not to the removal but 
the reconciliation with the katechon as a temporary figure of the reign of the second-best, 
however ‘ambiguous’ or ‘daemonic’.69 Yet, neither is it a matter of the Derridean perpetual 
deferral of parousia as something ‘to come’ without ever actually arriving – a messianism 
that Agamben termed ‘thwarted’ and ‘paralyzed’.70 While Milbank’s reading of Paul leaps 
too quickly into counterfactual transcendence, Derrida’s messianism remains suspended in 
the state of nature deprived of grace, in which nothing can ever really come to an end.71  
In contrast to both Milbank and Derrida, what Agamben’s messianism affirms is the 
minimalist if not outright empty understanding of parousia that should nonetheless be held 
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rigorously distinct from its absence. We can never go back on nihilism and its naturalization 
of history but it does not follow from this that the horizon of redemption itself is to be 
annulled. What can be mobilized against the nihilistic reign of the katechon is the vacuity of 
the eschaton itself, ‘the perfectly empty sky of humanity’ that Agamben calls the 
‘irreparable’.72 The parousia that the katechons of our time delay is nothing more but nothing 
less than human life as such in its integral form, no longer separated between nature and 
history, fact and norm, life and law, but, wholly contained in ‘speech and praxis that have 
become transparent to themselves’.73 The question we shall address in the final section is how 
the katechonic restraint on this integral form of life may be removed. 
 
How to Get the Katechon Out of the Way 
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the concept of the katechon is not an obscure 
remnant of premodern politics but rather a paradigmatic example of the biopolitical logic of 
modern nihilism, characterized by the indefinite temporality of natural history. As a figure of 
constituted authority, the katechon is always already part of the natural anomie that it tries to 
restrain through artificial immunitary mechanisms of security, which, drawing for their 
resources on the very negativity that they are to confront, only succeed in exacerbating this 
negativity, perpetually threatening autoimmune self-destruction. The messianic project of the 
removal of the katechon must therefore respond to a double challenge: how to overcome the 
immanent transcendence of the katechon without persisting in the vicious circle of the 
negation of negativity.  
The solution to the first problem is quite easily inferred from the logical structure of 
the concept of the katechon as immanent transcendence. The katechon constitutes itself by 
separating the generalized anomie of the human condition from itself. It is only by 
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expropriating the anomie inherent in social praxis itself and containing it within an institution 
with claims to transcendence that the katechon emerges as a paradoxical power of evil over 
evil, which protects life by annihilating it and ensures order by suspending it. Yet, as we have 
seen, the claim of this power to transcendence is merely virtual, since it is impossible for a 
createrly lord of creatures to ever fully escape the terrain of natural immanence. The removal 
of the katechon thus calls for the return of this virtual and symbolic authority to the natural 
immanence, whose transcendence it vainly attests to. This return to immanence that Agamben 
has addressed in terms of profanation should be rigorously distinguished from the 
revolutionary strategy of seizing and reclaiming the transcendence of sovereignty and the 
anarchist strategy of abolishing this transcendence as such.74 The target of this operation is 
not a particular institutional structure (e.g. the state) but the katechonic function of the 
transcendence of nature. While our political imagination is today more attuned to the critique 
of naturalizations of all kinds, which finds the mediated and the constructed beneath every 
claim to natural immediacy, what is at stake here is the diametrically opposite strategy of the 
naturalization of the symbolic power of the katechon, a purposeful reification of the authority 
that can only exist as virtual and abstract. The messianic state of exception is thus produced 
by emptying out transcendence back into immanence, the kenosis of the katechon into the 
state of exception it can no longer exclude.  
Although necessary, the strategy of kenosis into immanence is not sufficient, since, as 
we have seen, immanence is where the katechon arises from as an apotropaic institution 
designed to protect this immanence from the negativity at its heart. As Virno reminds us, the 
power of negation required for this operation belongs to our natural powers that would reign 
unlimited in the purely immanentist society. This is why it would be far too simple to oppose 
the sovereign state with the immanentist self-governance of the multitude, seeking a way out 
of biopolitics through a reinvention of the polis. The entire discourse of ‘self-government’, in 
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all its versions from conservative communitarianism to councilist communism, must be 
problematized. We are therefore back to the problem of the negation of negativity whose 
resolution is the condition for any genuine move outside the vicious circle of immunitary 
nihilism.  
The resolution of this problem proceeds through the suspension of the apotropaic 
logic that generates the immanent transcendence of the katechon. What is at stake in 
Agamben’s minimalist version of messianism is no longer saving life from itself, 
transcending it in order to delay its self-destruction, but rather reclaiming the transcendence 
of the world itself as our ethos: ‘At the point you perceive the irreparability of the world, at 
that point it is transcendent.’75 This irreparable world is of course nothing other than the 
natural ambivalence of the human condition, which, from Hobbes to Virno, demands 
protection for and from itself. In contrast, for Agamben messianic redemption has nothing to 
do with the attainment of security: ‘Redemption is not an event, in which what was profane 
becomes sacred and what was lost is found again. Redemption is, on the contrary, the 
irreparable loss of the lost, the definitive profanity of the profane.’76 Contrary to Virno’s 
criticism of messianic politics as a quest for perfection that destroys the natural imperfection 
of the human condition, Agamben’s messianism consists precisely in the appropriation of our 
imperfection or impropriety as the sole content of the proper and the perfect.  
At first glance, this idea of redemption seems to be a particularly arcane version of 
Romantic naturalism. Yet, if we cannot overcome biopolitics by building a new polis, neither 
can we do so by unproblematically withdrawing into the natural immanence of life. In fact, it 
is precisely the impossibility of anything like a choice between history and nature that 
conditions the overcoming of the logic of the katechon. Since it is precisely the katechon that 
ensures the perpetuation of the historical dimension in a degraded state of aimless persistence 
in time by delaying the resolution of the ‘mystery of anomie’, its removal entails a veritable 
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end of history, which is the permanent theme of Agamben’s thought.77 Yet, insofar as 
parousia no longer reveals anything other than the irreparability of the world, this end of 
history does not inaugurate a new condition but only marks the return of history itself to 
nature, its decomposition and ruin under the ‘perfectly empty’ sky. The end of history in the 
sense of the suspension of attempts to transcend nature simultaneously marks the end of 
nature as the fictitious locus of extra-historical plenitude. Thus, it is neither history that is 
saved from nature through its immanent transcendence nor nature that is saved from history 
through a return to the pre-historical immanence. What is saved and let be is rather the 
potentiality of existence in the zone of indistinction between history and nature, ‘where 
history merges with the setting’.78  
A politics based on a messianic re-interpretation of 2 Thessalonians 2 is therefore the 
very opposite of utopianism, promising no bright future but only the reappropriation of the 
existent: ‘everything will be as is now, just a little different.’79 The little difference that 
makes all the difference is that this irreparable world would be truly and fully ours, no longer 
fractured by negativity and deferral but wholly available for use in social praxis, habitual 
action that constitutes our second nature.  
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